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ExperimentDo individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student-subjects? We
analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a game with positive
externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) and a similar game with negative externalities.
Depending on the treatment, a reward or sanction institution is either exogenously or endogenously implement-
ed. Police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and bear a higher burden of the sanction
costs compared to non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, subjects favor
rewards over sanctions, but police subjects are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also reward
and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote. Our experiment suggests
that lab evidence on social dilemma games with positive or negative externalities and enforcement institutions
is rather robust.1. Introduction
When a police officer pulls you over, a reward for not breaking the
law is usually the last thing on yourmind. Yet, in recent years numerous
police forces around the world have experimented with “positiveérieure de la Police (ENSP) and
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.cnrs.fr (M.C. Villeval).ticketing”, which involves giving out reward tickets and vouchers for
good behavior.1 These reward programs go against the old paradigm
of the corrective policing model (Becker, 1968).
One obvious reason why police almost exclusively use sanctions
is that it seems unnatural to reward those who comply with the law—
rewards are usually reserved for going above-and-beyond a norm, if1 For example, drivers in Sandy, Utah, were given vouchers for movie tickets for safe
driving behaviors in 2013, and drivers in the south of Francewere given 20Euro gas tickets
for driving below the blood alcohol limit during 2014 New Year's celebrations. Youth in
Decator, ILmight receive a free food voucher for using crosswalks or skateboarding in des-
ignated areas, and Toronto Police have articulated hopes that positive ticketing will help
facilitate communication and build trust in addition to encouraging good and legal behav-
iors (see http://www.positiveticketing.ca/default.aspx). While often targeted at youth,
such programs may reward anyone behaving virtuously or simply not breaking the law.
A positive ticketing program pioneer, Ward Clapham (a retired Canadian Mountie), esti-
mates that over 25 countries currently use such programs to at least some extent (see
http://news.msn.com/world/police-hope-positive-tickets-will-reduce-crime).
4 After running our experiment, we became aware of another study of trust and norm
enforcement conducted with applicants to the German police by Friebel and Kosfeld
(2013). The two studies differ in several respects. First, their study focuses on how individ-
uals self-select into an occupation based on their behavioral characteristics. Instead,we fo-
cus on comparing the use and efficacy of norm enforcement institutions in variousthey are given at all. There may be additional reasons why police prefer
sanctions to rewards for norm enforcement. Firstly, there may exist a
pure framing effect: sanctions may resonate more with norm enforce-
ment in “destructive” contexts compared to “constructive” contexts.
Norm violations involving active destructionmay triggermore negative
emotions than norm violations involving passive acts of omission
(e.g., failure to contribute to a public good). Secondly, sanctions may
bemore effective than rewards at norm enforcementwhen norm viola-
tion involves the destruction of wealth. Finally, one may conjecture
the existence of a pure police-specific effect. Specifically, police officers
are more exposed to destructive contexts and disorderly elements of
society. As such, they may have a stronger inclination to use sanctions
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1995).2
Social dilemmas are popular for studying cooperation and social
norms because group welfare is at odds with the dominant strategy of
selfish free riding behavior. Early laboratory experiments have shown
that initial contributions in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism games
are substantially above the Nash prediction, but decline steadily as the
game is repeated (Isaac et al., 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Ledyard, 1995).
Research has also shown that, in otherwise parallel games, there is a
reducedwillingness to cooperatewhen externalities are negative rather
than positive, because the warm glow is stronger than the cold-prickle
(Andreoni, 1995). However, cooperation can be sustained in the long
run when punishment is available (Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Gächter et al., 2008). Punishment is typically directed at those
who violate the norm of cooperation, which is given by the average
group contribution level. This finding is robust to various environmental
conditions (Masclet et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006; Anderson and
Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Other studies have attempted to
investigate the effectiveness of reward mechanisms to enforce the
norm of cooperation (Dickinson, 2001; Andreoni et al., 2003; Walker
and Halloran, 2004; Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et al.,
2010; Dugar, 2013). Most of them show that rewards are somewhat
less effective than sanctions in enforcing cooperation.
The originality of our paper is threefold. First, we experimentally
investigate the effectiveness of punishment and reward institutions
not only in a constructive (Giving Game) social dilemma context but
also in an equivalent destructive (Taking Game) context. In the Giving
Game non-cooperation is failing to contribute to a public account,
whereas in the Taking Game, non-cooperation involves active with-
drawals from a common account. The two games are linear public
good/bad games with the same dominant strategy Nash equilibrium
of no cooperation.3 While the effect of sanctions/rewards is well docu-
mented in a positive frame, their effectiveness is less well-established
when the social dilemma is negatively framed. Using Common Pool
Resource (CPR) games, some find that sanctions improve cooperation
(Ostrom et al., 1992; Casari and Plott, 2003; van Soest and Vyrastekova,
2006), but others find the opposite result (Janssen et al., 2010; Cason
and Gangadharan, forthcoming). In the same vein, the use of rewards
to enforce cooperation in a CPR context has received less attention
(exceptions include Vyrastekova and Van Soest, 2008; Stoop et al.,
2013), even though its relevance to the real world is clear. One novelty
of our design is that we can compare the impact of the various norm
enforcement mechanisms in constructive versus destructive, but other-
wise identical, linear social dilemmas. This allows us to test for social
dilemma framing effects on sanctions and rewards.2 The comments of a police officer in the “Pops for Cops” program in Decatur, IL, illus-
trate this point: “Like many professional law enforcement officers, I brought a certain
mentality to the job. I wanted to hunt down criminals — chase bad guys, kick in doors,
get the bust. It was hunter vs. hunted… I can't escape the realities of my job — I have to
hunt down criminals. But could I alsowork on the other end of the spectrum? Could I build
positive relationships strong enough to keep youth out of trouble?”.
3 Our Taking Game is therefore distinct from the CommonPool Resource game that rep-
resents a non-linear social dilemma gamewith an interior equilibrium in the choice space
(Ostrom et al., 1992).The second originality of our paper is that we enroll a representative
sample of new French police commissioners to formmixed groups with
participants from a standard student subject-pool. Our aim is to analyze
whether police commissioners behave differently in terms of institu-
tional choices andnormenforcement. This population is perfectly suited
for our study because police commissioners have self-selected into
a ‘mission-oriented’ occupation in the destructive context of crime
deterrence, and because their training and core function are in law
enforcement (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Additionally, some of these
commissioners had completed their training two years prior to our ex-
periment, while others were still in training. This allows us to examine
whether some experience with crime and enforcement affects behavior
in our games. When comparing commissioners with non-police sub-
jects, our intuition is that commissioners may have a stronger prefer-
ence for sanctions due to both their occupational selection and explicit
training to favor sanctions over rewards (Raganella and White, 2004;
Wu et al., 2009).4,5 Our artefactual field experiment therefore contrib-
utes to discussion regarding the external validity of experiments by
comparing career professionals with student-subjects (Dyer et al.,
1989; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Alatas et al.,
2009; Carpenter and Seki, 2011). In his survey, Frechette (2015) finds
no evidence that conclusions based on standard student-subject pools
cannot generalize to professionals, as well as to the literature on how
experience affects framing effects (e.g., Gächter et al., 2009; List, 2003).
Finally our third contribution is to vary the way the enforcement
institution is implemented (exogenously or endogenously through
a majority vote) so that we can test whether, as government agents,
police commissioners are more willing to utilize an institution when it
results from a democratic choice. We thus contribute to the literature
on endogenous institutions in social dilemmas (Gürerk et al., 2006;
Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010;
Putterman et al., 2011; see Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2003 for a com-
mon pool context).
Our experiment consists of four treatments in both Giving and
Taking Game contexts: Baseline, Reward, Sanction, and Vote. The Base-
line treatment of the Giving Game is a linear public good game (public
bad in the case of the Taking Game) without any enforcement institu-
tion. In the Sanction (Reward) treatment, a new stage is added. After
being informed of each groupmember's contribution, subjects can sanc-
tion (reward) others at personal cost. Finally, in the Vote treatment,
subjects vote in a preliminary stage for their preferred institution
(Reward and Sanction), and the majority vote determines the institu-
tion that is implemented for all rounds.
Our results show that socially desirable behavior (i.e., contributing
in the Giving Game or non-extracting in the Taking Game) is higher in
the positive compared to the negative context; the existence of norm
enforcement increases socially desired behavior; and police subjects
contribute more (extract less) than non-police subjects. We also find
that, after controlling for a possible selection bias in the decision to
use the institution, the intensity of both sanctions and rewards is higherenvironments given that subjects are police or non-police. We do not try to determine
whether the behavior of police subjects is due to behavioral self-selection into the occupa-
tion or whether it results from the training in law enforcement they receive. Second, their
subject-pool consists mainly of students in the final year of the high school, who may ap-
ply to the police. Instead, most French police commissioners hold a Masters degree. Third,
their design is based on a trust game with a third-party and individuals can use both re-
wards and sanctions in the same periods (in ours it is one or the other), and it does not in-
clude endogenous institutions. Our studies are therefore complementary.
5 Prendergast (2007) shows that among public employees, if social workers are more
likely to be biased in favor of their clients, police officers are more likely biased against
their clients, i.e. those who break the law. If behavior in law enforcement transposes to
norm enforcement, commissioners may be more inclined to sanction than reward.
in a negative context compared to a positive one. Interestingly, we find
that police subjects enforce norms more than non-police subjects and
particularly when the institution results from a majority vote. This
helps explain the fact that the presence of more police subjects in a
group raises its efficiency. Though all subjects prefer rewards, police
subjects are relativelymore likely to vote for sanctions. Perhaps related-
ly, we also find that subjects are more likely to vote for the sanction in-
stitution when the vote occurs later in the game, because subjects will
have had longer exposure to cooperative decay and norm violation.
2. Experimental design
Our design consists of four treatments: Baseline, Reward, Sanction,
and Vote. The Baseline allows us to compare behavior against results
established in the literature. The Reward and Sanction treatments add
the possibility of assigning costly reward or punishment points, respec-
tively, as a way of enforcing norms of cooperation. Finally, the Vote
treatment implements an endogenous enforcement institution by
allowing subjects to vote as to whether the reward or sanction insti-
tution should be used. These treatments are administered in both
positive and negative frames. Therefore, we have a 4 × 2 mixed
design (4 treatments within-subjects, and Taking or Giving Game
as between-subjects factors). Police and non-police subjects were
matched randomly in groups of five players, using an anonymous
partner matching protocol.6
2.1. Treatment parameters
2.1.1. Baseline treatments
In the Baseline Giving Game treatment, each of the five homog-
enously endowed subjects allocates 20 ECU (Experimental Currency
Units) to a private or a group account. Payoffs, as a function of the
contribution of subject i, xi, are defined as follows:
πGGi ¼ 20−xi þ 0:3
X5
j¼1
xj: ð1Þ
In contrast with Fehr and Gächter (2000), we give feedback regard-
ing each other's member contribution after each period for consistency
with our other treatments.
In the Baseline Taking Game treatment, each of the five groupmem-
bers may withdraw wi ∈ [0,20] from the group account. The payoff
function of subject i is the following:
πTGi ¼ wi þ 30−0:3
X5
j¼1
wj: ð2Þ
It can be easily seen from Eqs. (1) and (2) that the two games are
equivalent with wi = 20 − xi ∀ i ∈ {1,…, 5}.
2.1.2. Sanction treatments
The sanction institution is implemented exogenously. Each period
now consists of two stages. The first stage is identical to the decision6 Several reasonsmotivated our choice of using a partnermatching design. Thefirst rea-
son is the necessarily limited number of police-subjects, and a strangermatching requires
more participants to get sufficient independent observations. Second, our main variables
of interest (framing and police effects) should not be directly affected by the matching
protocol. Finally, police officers mention themselves that the relationship with criminals
shares several features of a long term-relationship. Indeed, police officers are typically
assigned to districts of relatively limited size where they often interact with the same in-
dividuals. Furthermore, if criminals are not necessarily confrontedwith the same commis-
sioners in each instance, repeat interaction is still possible due to the prevalence of
recidivism (see for example Durose et al., 2014).stage in the Baseline treatment. In the second stage, the subjects have
the opportunity to assign costly sanction points, P, to each other group
member. The payoff function, shown in the case of the Taking Game,
becomes:
πTGi ¼ wi þ 30−0:3
X5
j¼1
wj
0
@
1
A−
X
j≠i
cPji−
X
i≠ j
kPij ð3Þ
where ∑
j≠i
cPji is the total cost of sanctions assigned by subjects j to
subject i, with c indicating the per-unit cost of each point received
(c = 2 ECUs).7 ∑
i≠ j
kPij is the total cost to subject i of the sanctions she
imposes on all subjects j, with k= 1 ECU being the cost to i of each sanc-
tion point assigned to any other player. A subject can assign amaximum
of 10 sanction points to each other player. The total cost of points
received cannot exceed the subject's earnings from the first stage.
2.1.3. Reward treatments
These treatments are similar to the Sanction treatments except that
instead of punishing others, each subject can reward them by assigning
reward points, R. Each reward point assigned costs k= 1 ECU and each
reward point received increases one's payoff by c= 2 ECUs. The payoff
function, again shown in the case of the Taking Game, is:
πTGi ¼ wi þ 30−0:3
X5
j¼1
wj
0
@
1
Aþ
X
j≠i
cRji−
X
i≠ j
kRij ð4Þ
where ∑
j≠i
cRji is the total rewards gain assigned by players j to player i
and ∑
i≠ j
kRij is the total cost to player i of points assigned to others. A
maximum of 10 points can be assigned to each other player and the
gain of the total points received cannot exceed the subject's earnings
from the first stage.
2.1.4. Vote treatments
The sanction or reward institution is implemented endogenously by
adding a preliminary stage where subjects vote only once for whether
the reward or sanction institution should apply to the subsequent
rounds in the treatment. Voting entails no monetary cost, the majority
vote institution is implemented, and there is no feedback on individual
votes of others.8
2.2. Experimental procedures
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were conducted at GATE-LAB, Lyon,
France. There were nine sessions in total (five Taking Game and four
Giving Game sessions). Within a session, the Baseline (B) treatment
was always played first, and Reward (R) and Sanction (S) treatments
were always adjacent (but counterbalanced in order). The Vote
(V) treatment was counterbalanced to be either before or after the Re-
ward and Sanction treatments, which allows us to examine institutional
experience effects on reward/sanction preferences. Table 1 displays ses-
sion details, including the treatment orderings administered.7 In Fehr andGächter (2000) and inmost following studies on sanctions in VCM games,
the cost ratio is 1:3.We chose aweaker 1:2 ratio becausewewanted to hold this ratio con-
stant for reward and sanction points.We feared that using a higher ratio for reward points
would lead subjects to assign points to others not to enforce the cooperation norm, but to
create reciprocity and increase payoffs. A lower ratio should, we thought, limit this
motivation.
8 Our procedure differs from Sutter et al. (2010) where subjects could vote between
standard VCM, reward, and punishment by approval voting; voting was costly, voluntary,
and repeated until unanimity was achieved.
Table 1
Description of sessions.
Session Sequence Game # Police/total # subjects # Groups, by # police subjects in the group
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 BRSV Taking 10/20 – 1 1 1 1 –
2 BRSV Giving 9/20 1 – 1 1 1 –
3 BSRV Taking 10/20 – – 2 2 – –
4 BSRV Taking 10/20 – 1 – 3 – –
5 BVRS Taking 10/20 – – 2 2 – –
6 BVSR Taking 10/20 – – 2 2 – –
7 BSRV Giving 11/20 – – 2 1 1 –
8 BVRS Giving 9/20 – – 3 1 – –
9 BVSR Giving 8/20 1 1 1 – – 1
Total 87/180 2 3 14 13 3 1
Percentage 48.33 5.56 8.33 38.89 36.11 8.33 2.78
Note: B: Baseline treatment; R: Reward treatment; S: Sanction treatment; V: Vote treatment.In a session, subjects played ten periods in the Baseline and seven
periods in each of the three other treatments.9 It was common knowl-
edge that, while the composition of the group was fixed throughout
the game, the group member ID numbers displayed on the feedback
screens were reshuffled at each period so that it was impossible to re-
ciprocate the action of a specific group member in the previous period.
This was intended to prevent the possibility of individual reputation
formation and to avoid counter-punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000;
Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) or counter-rewarding
(Stoop et al., 2011). The final earnings in these tasks were the sum of
payoffs from all 31 periods.
Each session involved 20 subjects, 8 to 10 of whomwere police com-
missioners. Participants were not aware of the characteristics of the other
participants: students didnot know that theywere interactingwithpolice
subjects. The right part of Table 1 indicates the distribution of the groups
based on the number of police subjects in the group. In 27 out of the 36
groups of 5 members (75%) there were either 2 or 3 police subjects.
Thus the commissioners and students are not perfectly evenly balanced
across groups but the distribution does not differ across frames.
Upon arrival, and after informed consent was obtained, subjects
drew a ticket from an opaque bag assigning them to a specific terminal
in the laboratory. Experimental instructions were distributed for each
part after completion of the previous part (see Appendix). Instructions
used neutral wording such as contribution (Giving Game) and with-
drawal (Taking Game). Sanctions (rewards) were labeled as “points
that decrease (increase) others' payoffs”. After reading the instructions
aloud, we used a questionnaire to verify each subject's understanding
and any questions were answered in private. Before the subjects played
the Taking or theGiving game,we elicited their risk attitudes anddegree
of trust.10 Sessions lasted 2 h on average. Average earnings were €26.19
(S.D. = 4.39), which were paid in private in a separate room.
2.3. Subject pools
In total, 180 subjects from two different pools participated in
this experiment. The regular pool includes 93 subjects who were9 Initially, we planned to run 10 periods in each of the four treatments. Unfortunately,
and despite a pilot sessionwith our usual subject-pool, we realized during thefirst session
that some subjects were very slow tomake decisions. Therefore, we decided to reduce the
number of periods to 7 after the Baseline treatment. We kept the same structure for the
remaining sessions. For comparisons in thedata analysis,weuse periods 1 to 7 for all treat-
ments except for the Baseline.
10 To elicit risk attitudeswe used theHolt and Laury (2002) procedure.We found no sig-
nificant difference between subject pools (the mean numbers of safe choices out of 10
were 5.83 (1.78) and 5.82 (1.71) for police and non-police subjects, respectively
(Mann–Whitney test, two tailed,p=0.910)). Then, participants played a trust game (Berg
et al., 1995) in both roles under the strategy method. No significant difference was found
either in trusting behaviors (themean amounts sent by player A to player B out of 10were
2.69 (SD 1.77) and 2.41 (SD 1.88) for police and non-police subjects, respectively
(p= 0.448)). Feedback on these two tasks was only given at the end of the session.recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Most were un-
dergraduate students from local engineering and business schools;
aminority of subjectswere older participants, either campus employees
or retirees.
The other subject-pool consists of 87 volunteers who had recently
passed the very competitive national exam of police commissioners.
We have two main types of subjects within this pool. The majority
(73 of 87) were still studying in the elite national school of police com-
missioners (Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, ENSP, a French
“Grande Ecole”), the only school for police commissioners in France,
located near Lyon. This sample is a representative of the population of
France's newly appointed police commissioners since each cohort
includes 40 students who spend 2 years at ENSP (meaning that the
participation rate for the students at ENSP is above 90%). During their
training they spend 14 months as interns in operational services; the
rest of the time, they are trained in human resources management,
intelligence services, and management of public order. A minority
(14 subjects) had finished training at ENSP two years prior and either
had a permanent position as police commissioner or was in an intern-
ship at the time of our experiment. Specifically, at the end of training
new commissioners will have to lead specialist departments or police
districts and they are immediately appointed to small jurisdictions or
are deputy commissioners in medium-sized town police stations. They
are directly involved in police duties (maintaining public order, home-
land defense, investigations, road safety, policing of organized crime
or money laundering, etc.). They direct the work of policemen and
lead critical operations.11 These subjects, who have therefore had
more crime exposure than those still in training, participated in our
experiment during a post-training return to ENSP. Compared to our
non-police subjects, police subjects are older (32.82 ± 7.37 year old,
min = 23, max = 48 vs. 24.82 ± 9.22 year old, min = 18, max = 64)
and more typically male (79.66% vs. 44.26%). Due to these differ-
ences, we systematically control for age and gender in our regression
analysis.1211 We want to specifically highlight that these subjects are not police officers with some
supervisory duties but rather, individuals trained as police commissioners, who oversee or
will oversee entire city police forces.
12 With non-standard subject pools, it is especially important to avoid experimenter de-
mand effects, which may bemotivated by social desirability, because they could generate
differences of behavior. As remarked by Zizzo (2010), what is crucial is the belief that the
subjects hold about the experimenters' objectives and how they can be related to the real
objectives. Our subjects were very likely not able to identify the aim of our study. First,
they had to participate in several tasks, making the environment multi-dimensional and
our objective not transparent. Second, only the directors of the school were aware of the
content of our tests and they committed not to reveal it to the participants. Third, it was
made clear to the participants before the experiment that the results were collected for
scientific reasons and that no individual data would be communicated to the school at
any time. Furthermore, participants committed not to reveal the experimental protocol
to other subjects before completion of all the sessions.
3. Theoretical predictions
3.1. Standard predictions
We first derive predictions based on rational and selfish money
maximizing agents, in which case the predictions are similar for police
and non-police subjects. The equilibrium in a negative frame (Taking
Game) is the same as in a positive one (Giving Game). Thus, we will
merely describe predictions as a function of the enforcement institution
and not the framing of the social dilemma.
In the Baseline treatments, it can easily be seen from Eqs. (1) and
(2) that the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium is for all subjects
to place all 20 ECU in their private account (xi = 0) contributing
nothing or, alternatively, extracting all from the public good (wi =
20) in each round of this finitely repeated game. In equilibrium,
each subject earns 20 ECU and total group earnings are 100 ECU.
In contrast, the strategy leading to the Pareto optimum is xi = 20
(or, wi = 0), which generates total group earnings of 150 ECU (30
ECU per subject).
In both the Sanction and the Reward treatments, the only Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium, whether played once or finitely repeated, is also
xi = 0 or wi = 20 for all i and no use of sanctions or rewards because
both are costly. In the Vote treatment, self-interested individuals should
be indifferent between available institutions. Contribution or with-
drawal behavior should not be affected by the choice of enforcement
institution since sanctions/rewards are not credible. Thus, with money-
maximizing self-interested play, the equilibrium prediction is the same
across all enforcement institutions, games, and subject pools. Observed
differences must therefore be attributed to behavioral factors resulting
from a desire to enforce behavioral norms and/or the psychological
impact of a positive vs. negatively framed social dilemma decision
environment.3.2. Behavioral predictions
Our first set of conjectures concerns the norm of cooperation in
the Baseline. Introducing other-regarding preferences might take
the form of advantageous inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999), social preferences for fairness and efficiency (Charness and
Rabin, 2002), or imperfect conditional cooperation (Fischbacher
et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Such theories predict
that cooperation may result with sufficient numbers of cooperators
in a group, though contributions may still decline over time. One
may therefore conjecture that people with other-regarding prefer-
ences should contribute positive amounts of their endowment in
all treatments.
Regarding subject pool effects, we predict that police commissioners
will bemore cooperative than others, given their stronger norm of civic
cooperation and because they self-selected into a public good oriented
occupation where helping others is key motivation (Raganella and
White, 2004). Indeed, civil servants, whose job is to serve public inter-
ests, might be more cooperative because people in mission-oriented
jobs are usually intrinsically motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak,
2005) who place more value on the output of public organizations
(François, 2000).13 This prediction is also based on evidence from
cross-cultural studies showing that cooperation in social dilemmas is
higher in countries with stronger norms of civic cooperation and weak
laws (Herrmann et al., 2008).13 Investigations on the motivation for entering the police emphasize the importance of
non-monetary dimensions, such as the willingness to help people and social status
(Hageman, 1979; Moon and Hwang, 2004; Raganella and White, 2004; Tarng et al.,
2001;Wu et al., 2009). Social contribution is also ranked as thefirst determinant of job sat-
isfaction by police officers (Carlan, 2007).Based on the previous literature, we also expect to observe framing
effects that promote higher cooperation in the Giving Game than in
the Taking Game (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Messer et al., 2007).
We summarize our first set of conjectures as C1:
C1: a) Police subjects cooperate more than non-police subjects.
b) Cooperation is more likely in the Giving Game than in the Taking
Game.
Our second set of conjectures is related to exogenous norm en-
forcement institutions. Sutter et al. (2010) demonstrate that the
use of rewards in equilibrium is predicted by the Charness and
Rabin (2002) model of social preferences only if there are enough
subjects who value social welfare as strongly as their own payoff.
Punishment in equilibrium is predicted by the inequity aversion
model only under very restrictive conditions. Based on previous
evidence, we conjecture that a fraction of the subjects will sacrifice
resources to sanction and/or reward and that rewards will be pre-
ferred to sanctions because they are more efficient (Sefton et al.,
2007; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Because their occupation
is mission-oriented (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) and because it re-
quires expertise in law enforcement to fight deviant behavior (Wu
et al., 2009), we conjecture that police subjects will be willing to
bear a disproportionate burden of enforcement costs. Finally, regard-
ing framing effects, we expect more sanctions in the Taking Game
both because we predict less cooperation and because norm viola-
tion involves active destruction of the public resource. Such an act
of commission may trigger negative emotions more than the norm
violation by an act of omission (i.e., failure to contribute in the Giving
Game). In the same vein, not withdrawing money from the existing
group account may also trigger more positive emotions than non-
contributing in the Giving Game.
We summarize our second set of conjectures as C2:
C2: a) Police subjects enforce norms more than non-police, particu-
larly with sanctions and in the negative frame. b) More sanctions
(rewards) are assigned in the Taking Game.
Our last set of conjectures is related to the endogenous norm
enforcement institutions. Because police fight crime with threats
and sanctions, we conjecture that police commissioners will be
more inclined than non-police subjects to vote in favor of sanctions.
We also predict that, as government agents, police will use a norm
enforcement institution more intensely when it results from a
vote. Finally, we predict that endogenously selected institutions
will promote more cooperation (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld
et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). We summarize our third set of con-
jectures as C3:
C3: a) Police subjects vote more in favor of the sanction institution
than others. b) Subjects, especially police subjects, use enforcement
more intensively when the institution results from a democratic
vote. c) Endogenous institutions increase cooperation relative to ex-
ogenously implemented institutions.
4. Results
4.1. Cooperation
In what follows, ‘contribution’ refers to the amount not extracted
from the group account in the Taking Game or the amount placed in
the group account in the Giving Game. Figs. 1 and 2 display mean con-
tributions over time per treatment in the Giving and Taking games,
respectively.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the average contribution over time, by treatment— Giving Game.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the average contribution over time, by treatment— Taking Game.Both figures exhibit the standard decay of contributions over time in
the Baseline treatments.14 Focusing first on the exogenous enforcement
institutions, we find that mean contributions are significantly higher
in Sanction treatments compared to Baseline (Mann–Whitney test,
p b 0.001 and p = 0.025 in the Giving and the Taking Games,
respectively).15 Mean contributions are also higher in the Reward treat-
ments compared to Baseline treatments (p = 0.029 and 0.051).16
Sanctions tend to outperform Rewards, but the difference is not signifi-
cant (p=0.291 and 0.204). These findings are consistent with previous
literature. Figs. 1 and 2 also indicate that when a vote resulted in
the sanction institution, cooperation increases dramatically compared
to Baseline (p = 0.007 and 0.001, in Giving and Taking Games, respec-
tively). Endogenous sanctions also increase contributions compared
to exogenous sanctions in the Giving Game (p = 0.065), but not in the
Taking Game (p = 0.221). Compared to Baseline, the increase in con-
tributions from endogenous rewards is not statistically significant
(p=0.148 and 0.484 in theGiving and the Taking Games, respectively),
nor is the increase seenwith exogenous rewards (p=0.511 and 0.526).
This is intriguing, as we could have expected that the positive signal
given by a majority voting in favor of rewards would have resulted in
a higher willingness to contribute. Regarding framing effects, our data
show that contributions are higher in the Giving compared to Taking
Game, but the differences are not significant. Baseline mean contribu-
tions (ECUs) are 6.49 in the Giving Game and 5.46 in the Taking Game
(p = 0.324). In Sanction treatments they are 13.10 (Giving Game)14 Since we were not able to randomize all the possible orderings of treatments, due to
an insufficient number of police-subjects, the Baseline treatment was always played first.
This may have transferred learning to the following treatments (Andreoni, 1988). It is
therefore important to check that our treatment differences are not driven by a different
behavior in the Baseline. We tested that the mean contribution behavior in the Baseline
is not different across the various sequences of treatments (BRSV, BSRV, BVRS and BVSR),
by means of Kruskal–Wallis tests. The mean group contribution in the first ten periods
gives one independent observation. No significant difference across sequences of treat-
ments was found (p= 0.141 in the positive frame and p= 0.679 in the negative frame).
15 Unless if specified otherwise, all the non-parametric tests reported in the paper are
two-tailedMann–Whitney tests inwhich the groupmean's behavior (contribution, for ex-
ample) over the set of periods in one treatment is taken as one independent observation.
This implies that when we compare contributions in two treatments, we do not take into
account the fact that a treatment may have a different location in a sequence across
groups. This is a limitation because it does not take into account sequence order effects.
This constraint comes from the limited number of groups in each treatment of each se-
quence. Therefore, the results of the tests should be taken cautiously.
16 Our non-parametric tests are qualitatively similarwhen one restricts our data analysis
to thefirst seven periods in all treatments including the Baseline (see footnote 9). The only
exception is that the difference between the Baseline and the Reward treatments in the
Taking Game is no longer significant. Our econometric analysis is however unchanged
whether or not we restrict the number of periods in the Baseline to thefirst seven periods.compared to 10.91 (TakingGame) (p=0.347), and inReward treatments
they are 10.94 (Giving Game) and 8.32 (Taking Game) (p= 0.156).
We turn next to comparisons across subject-pools. Fig. 3 displays
average contribution levels for police and non-police subjects, by treat-
ment in the Giving and the Taking Games. This figure suggests that in all
treatments police subjects cooperate more on average than non-police.
However, we find no statistically significant subject pool effects in
any treatment (p N 0.10 in all cases). If we pool the Taking game and
the Giving game together, then we find that the Vote-Sanction treat-
ment police subjects contribute significantly more than non-police
(18.42 vs. 17.03 ECUs, p = 0.088). The fact that most non-parametric
tests fail to identify significant effects here is not that surprising since
our subject-pools differ on characteristics not controlled for in the
non-parametric analysis.We therefore appeal to parametric data analy-
sis to further investigate differences across subject pools.
Table 2 reports the marginal effects of two random-effects Tobit
regressions analyzing the determinants of the contribution decision.
Randomeffects control for the lack of independence of the contributions
of a given subject across decision rounds and Tobit models are justified
by the fact that contributions are censured both at 0 and 20 ECU. We
pool the data from all treatments and we standardize contributions ofOthers
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Table 2
Determinants of contribution levels.
Dependent variable Random effects Tobit models
Contribution (1) (2)
Sanction treatment 1.373***(0.110) 1.399***(0.111)
Reward treatment 0.837***(0.091) 0.853***(0.092)
Vote Sanction treatment 2.991***(0.229) 3.045***(0.230)
Vote Reward treatment 0.681***(0.088) 0.694***(0.089)
Giving Game 0.484**(0.189) 0.469**(0.194)
Order of treatment −0.150***(0.030) −0.153***(0.030)
Period −0.121***(0.011) −0.123***(0.012)
Last period −0.130**(0.062) −0.131**(0.063)
Police – 0.432* (0.224)
Police with experience – −0.342 (0.375)
Age – −0.007 (0.012)
Male – 0.066 (0.202)
Trust – 0.056 (0.051)
Political orientation – 0.023 (0.045)
N 5580 5580
Left-censored obs. 1903 1903
Right censored obs. 1643 1643
Log-likelihood −10,524.828 −10,521.476
Note: This table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indi-
cate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively for the 2-tailed test. The
5580 observations correspond to the 180 subjects observed in 31 periods of game.individual i in period t as the dependent variable by defining contribu-
tions in the Taking Game as the amount (20-wit) that is notwithdrawn.
Independent variables include a dummy variable for the Giving Game
and treatment dummies (Baseline is the omitted reference treatment).
Order of treatment captures whether the treatment was played 1st,
2nd, 3rd, or 4th within the session. We also include controls for Period
(1–7) and a Last period dummy to control for end-game effects. Model
(2) adds a Police subject dummy, a Police with experience dummy
for commissioners in an active position and variables for age, gender,
trust and political orientation.17
Table 2 shows that, relative to Baseline, cooperation is higher when
norm enforcement is possible. This is especially true with Sanction, as
its coefficient is significantly higher than the coefficient on the Reward
treatment. We also find that endogenous sanctions (Vote Sanction)
lead to even higher contributions than exogenous sanctions. T-tests
for all these pairwise comparisons in the models give p b 0.001. In con-
trast, the coefficient on Vote Reward is significantly smaller than the
coefficient on Reward (p = 0.008). This could result from the fact that
a majority vote in favor of sanctions is a clearer signal against free-
riders than a vote in favor of rewards. These estimated effects are robust
across models.18
Table 2 also shows that the police-subjects contribute significantly
more than the non-police subjects.19 This finding supports conjecture
C1a. Experience in policework has no additional effect. Oncewe control
for other variables, contributions are significantly higher in the Giving
Game than in the Taking Game, which supports C1b. Not surprisingly,
cooperation declines over time, both across periods within a treatment
and across treatments within a sequence. In additional estimations
(available upon request), we also tested whether the framing effect17 “Trust” corresponds to the amount sent by player A to player B in the trust game. The
“political orientation” variable corresponds to the response to the following question in
the post-experimental questionnaire: “In politics one usually speaks of right and left.
Where do you situate yourself on a scale from 1 on the left to 10 on the right?”.
18 We also ran these regressions after adding interaction terms between the Vote
Reward and the Vote Sanction treatments, respectively, and a binary variable capturing
the fact that the subject voted or not against the majority of his group. These terms are
not significant in any model, showing no evidence of a crowding-out effect of not belong-
ing to the majority on contributions (regressions available upon request).
19 Gächter et al. (2004) also report that non-students contributemore than students but
their results are from a one-shot VCM environment as opposed to our multi-period envi-
ronment. In what follows, our additional results regarding norm enforcement and prefer-
ence for punishment over rewards helps us attribute our subject pool effects to the special
attributes of police officers, as opposed to non-students.was different across subject pools by including an interaction term
Police Subject* Giving Game. This variable is not significant, indicating
that some experience with real world norm enforcement does not
impact framing effects on cooperation in our experiments.20 We also
fail to find any significant effect of a variable capturing the number of
police subjects among the other groupmembers,which is not surprising
since this information was unknown to the subjects.
These findings are summarized in Result 1.
Result 1. a) Police subjects contribute significantly more than non-police
subjects. b) Contributions are significantly higher in the Giving Game
than in the Taking Game. c) Cooperation is higher when norm enforcement
is possible. d) Sanctions are more effective than rewards. e) Endogenous
sanctions lead to higher contributions than exogenous sanctions.4.2. Sanctions and rewards
Fig. 4 shows the average assigned enforcement points per treatment
and subject-pool. It shows that subjects are willing to use both rewards
and sanctions to enforce norms, even at personal cost. This figure also
shows no systematic tendency to use sanctions more intensively rela-
tive to rewards, except when the institution is endogenous. In this
case, subjects are more willing to reward than punish in the Giving
Game (Mann–Whitney test, p = 0.093), but not in the Taking Game
(p = 0.513). Fig. 4 suggests that police subjects enforce norms more
intensively than non-police subjects in all treatments. Finally, it shows
that the mean number of both sanction and reward points is lower in
the Giving Game than in the Taking Game.
Table 3 analyzes the determinants of norm enforcement bymeans of
a random-effects GLS model (column 1) and two random-effects Tobit
models (columns 2 and 3). The dependent variable is the number of
assigned points (both punishment and reward points) by each player i
to each other player j within her group. The independent variables in
Table 3 are mostly similar to those in Table 2. In model (1), we include
controls for the Giving Game and for each enforcement institution
(Reward treatment is the reference category). Controls are included
for order of treatment in the sequence, period of the game, a dummy
for last period and demographics. Model (2) adds controls for the points
received in the previous period and dummies for police subjects. Finally,20 This contrasts with other studies finding that real world experience reduces framing
effects (e.g., List, 2003; Gächter et al., 2009).
21 The fact that theGivingGame variable captures a positive and significant coefficient in
the selectionmodel contrastswith thefindings on the intensity of punishment. On the one
hand people may be more willing to contribute to the second order public good (if one
considers the punishment itself as a public good) in the GivingGame,whichmaymotivate
them to punish more (binary decision). On the other hand, emotions triggered by devia-
tions may be stronger in the Taking Game, which may translate into a higher intensity
of punishment in this game.
22 The IMR is significant, indicating that it is important to respect the sequential structure
of the rewarding decision and analyze separately the binary decision to reward and the in-
tensity of rewards. The IMR was not significant in the sanction estimates, indicating that
simple GLS models would have provided rather similar findings.
Table 3
Determinants of sanction or reward decisions.
Dependent variable:
Number of reward
or sanction points
Random effects
GLS
Random effects
Tobit
Random effects
Tobit
(1) (2) (3)
Sanction treatment −0.072**(0.029) −0.085***(0.024) −0.125***(0.034)
Vote Sanction
treatment
0.004 (0.057) −0.079 (0.052) −0.229***(0.089)
Vote Reward
treatment
0.032 (0.032) −0.020 (0.025) −0.057 (0.035)
Giving Game −0.187# (0.115) 0.072 (0.083) 0.069 (0.083)
Order of treatment −0.147***(0.015) −0.105***(0.012) −0.106*** (0.012)
Period −0.106***(0.007) −0.066***(0.007) −0.066***(0.007)
Last period 0.077* (0.043) −0.012 (0.036) −0.012 (0.036)
Police – 0.189**(0.096) –
Police with experience – 0.045 (0.163) 0.040 (0.161)
Police*Sanction
treatment
– – 0.210**(0.100)
Police*Reward
treatment
– – 0.132 (0.099)
Police*Vote Sanction
treatment
– – 0.364**(0.140)
Police*Vote Reward
treatment
– – 0.205**(0.101)
Points received in
previous period
– 0.056***(0.003) 0.056***(0.003)
Age 0.011* (0.006) 0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Male 0.168 (0.120) 0.001 (0.087) −0.002 (0.09)
Trust 0.040 (0.031) 0.021 (0.022) 0.006 (0.005)
Political orientation −0.047* (0.027) −0.002 (0.019) −0.003 (0.019)
Constant 1.222*** (0.255) – –
N 15,120 12,960 12,960
Left censored obs. – 9954 9954
Log-likelihood – −11,450.914 −11,447.505
Note: This table reportsmarginal effects for the Tobitmodels. Standarderrors are inparen-
theses. GLS: Generalized Least Squares. ***, **, * and # indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
0.10, and 0.11 levels respectively for the 2-tailed test. The 12,960 observations correspond
to the 180 subjects' decisions regarding eachof their four groupmembers in the 18 periods
of game where sanctions or rewards can be assigned (excluding the first period of each
of the three treatments due to the introduction of the lagged variable points received
in t-1).model (3) includes several interaction variables to checkwhether police
subjects' decisions differ across treatments. Table 3 reports marginal
effects.
Model (1) shows that subjects assign significantly fewer punish-
ment points compared to reward points, and the number of points
assigned declines over time and over the sequence of treatments, possi-
bly because the use of norm enforcement is less necessary once it
has been previously used within a group. It also shows that subjects
tend to assign fewer points in the Giving game compared to a negative
frame, although this effect fails reaching significance (p = 0.11).
Model (2) indicates that police subjects engage significantly more
resources in norm enforcement than others and model (3) shows that,
in general, police subjects distribute more sanctions than others but
not more rewards. Police subjects also use both rewards and sanctions
significantly more than others when the institution is implemented by
vote.
The Tobit regressions shown in Table 3 are based on the strong
assumption that independent variables affect the decision to punish
(reward) and the intensity of punishment (rewarding) to the same
degree. However, this may not be the case. Thus, alternative Heckman
two-step estimation procedures are reported in Table 4 to separately
analyze the determinants of sanction points assignment (columns
(1) to (3)) or reward points assignment (columns (4) to (6)) by a sub-
ject to each other group member. Specifically, a selection equation
is first estimated by means of a random-effects Probit to explain the
binary decision to punish (reward) (columns (1) and (4)). We then
explain the intensity of punishment (rewarding), conditional on the
decision to punish (reward), corrected for a potential selection bias
via the introduction of the inverse of the Mills ratio (IMR) from theselection equation as an explanatory variable. This second equation is
estimated as a random-effects Generalized Least Squares in columns
(2) and (5) for sanctions and rewards, respectively. The independent
variables in the selection equations are mostly similar to those in
Table 3. In addition, we add variables measuring a positive deviation
(Pos Dev Avg) and the absolute value of a negative deviation of the
contribution of the subject being assigned points from the rest of the
group average (|Neg Dev| Avg). We also include the Avg Contr Others
variable that measures the effect of others' contributions (excluding
the target's contribution but including the subject's contribution) on
one's own decision to assign points. The second-step GLS regressions
include the same variables as the selection equations except for the
time trend variables (period and end game) that allow us to identify
the model. In columns (3) and (6) we add interaction terms to check
whether police subjects' decisions differ when the institution is chosen
by the majority of members in the group. Table 4 reports marginal
effects.
The left panel of Table 4 indicates that the probability of assigning
sanctions declines over time. Column (1) shows that older participants
are more likely to sanction than younger subjects. Subjects contributing
more (less) than the group average are less (more) likely to be
punished, and subjects are less likely to punish themore others contrib-
ute. There is evidence of blind negative reciprocity, which suggests that
retaliation is also important in our experiment, as in Herrmann et al.
(2008). This effect is stronger in a positive frame as shown by the
positive coefficient associated with the interaction variable Points
received in t-1*Giving Game. Complementary estimates (available upon
request) in which we interact Police with Received points in t-1 show
that being a police subject has no effect on negative reciprocity. Finally,
the Giving Game variable captures a positive coefficient, suggesting that
subjects are more likely to punish in a giving context compared to a
destructive context. However, this effect is counterbalanced by the
fact that the intensity of punishment is significantly higher in the Taking
Game, which partly supports our conjecture that a negative frame trig-
gers more emotional arousal.21 In column (1), the coefficient associated
with police subjects with more experience is significant (p = 0.090),
suggesting that these subjects are more likely to punish free riders
than others. Moreover, columns (2) and (3) show that police subjects
assign significantly more punishment points than non-police subjects
and this effect is stronger when punishment results from a majority
vote (model (2)), in particular for more experienced commissioners
(model (3)).
The right panel of Table 4 reveals that the probability to reward also
declines over time while it increases if the institution results from a
majority vote. Subjects are more likely to reward above-average con-
tributors, and more likely to reward in general when others contribute
more (model (4)). There is also evidence of blind positive reciprocity
and complementary regressions (not reported here) show no impact
of being a police subject on blind reciprocity. Beingmore trustful signif-
icantly increases the probability to assign reward points.
The Heckit estimates indicate that, after controlling for the selection
bias (the IMR coefficient is significant), the intensity of rewards is sig-
nificantly lower in the Giving Game compared to the Taking Game,
which is consistent with our conjecture.22 Surprisingly, the intensity
Table 4
Determinants of sanction and reward decisions.
Dependent variable: Binary decision to
punish RE Probit
Intensity of
punishment RE GLS
Intensity of
punishment RE GLS
Binary decision to
reward RE Probit
Intensity of
reward RE GLS
Intensity of
reward RE GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote sanction/
Reward treatment
−0.016 −0.823 −0.691 0.015* −0.511*** −0.510***
(0.018) (0.940) (0.945) (0.008) (0.099) (0.099)
Giving Game 0.061** −1.011** −0.991** −0.014 −0.707** −0.710**
(0.030) (0.473) (0.475) (0.038) (0.338) (0.339)
Order of treatment 0.013 −0.151 −0.362 −0.030*** −0.236*** −0.236***
(0.009) (0.205) (0.227) (0.006) (0.051) (0.051)
Period −0.016*** – – −0.019*** – –
(0.003) (0.003)
Last period 0.008 – – −0.038*** – –
(0.013) (0.015)
Received points in t-1 0.003** −0.004 −0.009 0.008*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.026) (0.026) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Received points in t-1
*Giving Game
0.005** 0.013 0.019 0.004* 0.031* 0.032*
(0.002) (0.039) (0.039) (0.002) (0.017) (0.018)
Pos Dev Avg −0.005*** −0.018 −0.015 0.015*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.028) (0.028) (0.001) (0.016) (0.017)
|Neg Dev| Avg 0.021*** 0.081* 0.085* −0.029*** 0.044 0.043
(0.002) (0.047) (0.047) (0.002) (0.030) (0.030)
Avg Contr Others −0.006*** −0.055* −0.056* 0.018*** −0.055** −0.056**
(0.001) (0.029) (0.029) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022)
Police −0.004 0.771* 0.902* 0.047 −0.189 −0.208
(0.029) (0.460) (0.466) (0.041) (0.376) (0.377)
Police with Experience 0.080* −0.898 −1.282 −0.023 −0.034 0.077
(0.047) (0.759) (0.783) (0.071) (0.666) (0.675)
Police*Vote – 2.372** 1.810* – 0.640*** 0.679***
(0.971) (1.009) (0.137) (0.140)
Police with experience
*Vote
– – 1.501** – – −0.366
(0.697) (0.305)
Age 0.004** −0.005 −0.008 0.003 −0.006 −0.006
(0.001) (0.024) (0.024) (0.002) (0.019) (0.019)
Male 0.006 0.020 0.053 −0.040 0.462 0.471
(0.026) (0.438) (0.441) (0.039) (0.342) (0.344)
Trust 0.006 −0.045 −0.039 0.017* 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.105) (0.106) (0.009) (0.092) (0.092)
Political orientation b−0.001 −0.081 −0.087 b−0.001 −0.078 −0.080
(0.006) (0.092) (0.092) (0.008) (0.074) (0.051)
Inverse Mills' ratio – −0.261 −0.292 – −0.577*** −0.575***
(0.416) (0.416) (0.207) (0.207)
Constant – 4.551*** 5.103*** – 4.528*** 4.531***
(1.508) (1.530) (0.956) (0.958)
N 5280 916 916 7680 2090 2090
Log-likelihood −1522.210 – – −2491.376 – –
R2 0.100 0.102 0.072 0.072
Note: This table reports marginal effects for the Probitmodels. RE: Random effects. GLS: Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively for two-tailed tests. The 5280 observations correspond to the 180 subjects' decisions regarding each of their four group members observed in
periods of game with a sanction institution except the first period due to the introduction of the lagged variable Received points in t-1. The instrument variables are the trend variables
period and last period.of rewards is lower in the vote treatment. Finally, like for sanctions
we observe that police subjects are more likely to assign reward
points when the institution results from a majority vote (models (5)
and (6)).
To sum up, four results are of particular interest. First, the subjects
enforce norms more with reward than sanction institutions (Table 3).
Second, police subjects enforce norms significantly more than non-
police subjects (Tables 3 and 4). Overall, this supports our conjecture
C2a. We attribute these police subject results to the fact that police
work is one where law enforcement is almost entirely by use of sanc-
tions, and both training and experience with crime and law breaking
in their occupation may explain their higher intensity of punishment.
Third, police subjects tend to use both norm enforcement institutions
more when they result from a majority vote (Table 4). This police-
specific “democracy effect” might result from the civic values in the
occupation of police officers. Fourth, after controlling for the potential
selection bias in the binary decision to use rewards or sanctions, the
intensity of both punishment and rewarding is significantly higher
in the Taking Game context (Table 4). This supports our conjectureC2b. Our main findings regarding norm enforcement are summarized
in Result 2.
Result 2. a) Police subjects enforce norms significantly more than non-
police, especially with sanctions. b) Police enforce norms significantly
more when the enforcement institution results from a majority vote.
c) Conditional on the decision to enforce norms by assigning points, the
intensity of both sanctions and rewards is higher in the Taking Game.
An analysis of efficiency indicates that sanctions increase coopera-
tion the most, rewards increase overall efficiency, and efficiency is
systematically higher in the Giving Game than in the Taking Game
(see descriptive statistics on first-stage and final payoffs by treatment
in Appendix Table A1 and random-effects GLS estimates in Appendix
Table A2). However, it should be kept in mind that the limited number
of periods does not allow the long-term efficiency effect of sanctions to
fully develop (see Gächter et al., 2008). Appendix Table A2 also shows
that, due to their higher cooperativeness and norm enforcement, police
subjects do not earnmore than the other subjects, but groups populated
with more police subjects have significantly higher earnings.
Table 5
Preferences for norm enforcement institution.
Game Vote for
institution
Individual votes Group Majority vote Satisfaction rate
All Police Non-police Police Non-police
N = 100 N = 50 N = 50 N = 20
Taking Game Sanction 28 16 12 5 62.5% 50%
(28%) (32%) (24%) (25%)
Reward 72 34 38 15 94.1% 81.6%
(72%) (68%) (76%) (75%)
N = 80 N = 37 N = 43 N = 16
Giving Game Sanction 22 13 9 3 61.5% 22.2%
(27.5%) (35.1%) (20.9%) (18.7%)
Reward 58 24 34 13 87.5% 94.1%
(72.5%) (64.9%) (79.1%) (81.3%)4.3. Voting on norm enforcement institutions
Table 5 displays the distribution of individual votes and the group
majority vote for the reward and sanction institutions for each pool
of subjects in the Giving and Taking Games. It also indicates a proxy
for satisfaction in each game for each pool of subjects, i.e. the percentage
of subjects whose vote corresponds to the majority vote. Table 5 shows
that the proportion of subjects preferring the reward over sanction
institution is significantly higher in both game frames (binomial tests,
p b 0.01 for both), and there is no difference between reward institution
preference across the two games (χ2 test, p=0.941). As a result, 81.3%
of the 16 groups in the Giving Game and 75% of the 20 groups in the
Taking Game implement the reward institution. Although the majority
of police subjects also voted for reward, they were more inclined to
vote for sanction than non-police (Taking Game: 32% vs. 24%. Giving
Game: 35.1% vs. 20.9%). The difference is, however, not significant
(χ2 tests, p = 0.156 and p = 0.373 for the Giving and Taking Games,
respectively).
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of Probit regressions analyzing
the individual determinants of a vote for the sanction institution against
the reward institution. In model (1), we include controls for the Giving
Game, the late occurrence of the Voting treatment in the sequence toTable 6
Determinants of the vote for the sanction institution.
Dependent variable:
Vote for sanction
All sequences Experience of institution
BRSV and BSRV seq.
Experi
BRSV a
(1) (2) (3)
BRSV – −0.128 −0.11
(0.106) (0.109
Giving Game 0.008 0.099 0.116
(0.075) (0.106) (0.108
Vote Treatment Last 0.107*** – –
(0.039)
Null contribution in period 1
of the Baseline
−0.075 −0.152 −0.16
(0.092) (0.101) (0.103
Police 0.117* 0.199** 0.171#
(0.069) (0.087) (0.105
Police with experience – – 0.116
(0.147
Age −0.002 −0.008 −0.00
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006
Male −0.016 −0.057 −0.05
(0.069) (0.110) (0.109
Trust −0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.019) (0.029) (0.029
Political orientation 0.005 −0.015 −0.01
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021
N 180 100 100
Log-likelihood −99.418 −60.827 −60.5
Pseudo-R2 0.065 0.077 0.081
Note: This table reports marginal effects of Random Effects Logit models. Standard errors clust
0.05, 0.10, and 0.11 levels respectively, for two-tailed tests. The BRSV dummy variable correspo
The omitted variable corresponds to the BSRV sequence where participants vote just after expcheck whether experience with each institution matters in the voting
decision, a dummy for police and demographic controls. We also in-
clude a dummy variable indicatingwhether the subject has contributed
nothing in the first period of the Baseline treatment, i.e. before receiving
any feedback on others' behavior in this experiment. This variable aims
at testingwhether individuals who immediately free-ride in this exper-
iment are less likely to vote for sanctions than others. Models (2) to
(5) report separate estimates for subjects with and without experience
with the two enforcement institutions.Models (2) and (3) add the BRSV
dummy variable to check whether having experienced the sanction
institution instead of the reward institution just before voting favors
or not the vote for the sanction institution.
Table 6 indicates that having experienced both institutions before
voting increases the preference for sanctions, as shown by the signifi-
cant positive coefficient of the Vote Treatment Last variable in model
(1). Sanctions become more appealing after observing the decay of
cooperation and the typically higher marginal impact of sanctions rela-
tive to rewards. This is consistent with Gürerk et al. (2006). In contrast,
we find no effect of having experienced either the reward or the sanc-
tion institution immediately before the vote. Supporting conjecture
C3a, model (1) indicates that police subjects have a 11.7% higher prob-
ability to vote in favor of the sanction institution than non-police andence of institution
nd BSRV seq.
No experience of institution
BVSR and BVRS seq.
No experience of institution
BVSR and BVRS seq.
(4) (5)
0 – –
)
−0.055 −0.019
) (0.098) (0.086)
– –
0 0.075 0.101
) (0.115) (0.111)
−0.085 −0.137
) (0.127) (0.130)
– 0.438***
) (0.163)
8 0.009 0.011
) (0.006) (0.006)
5 0.064 0.044
) (0.081) (0.081)
−0.004 −0.007
) (0.018) (0.018)
5 0.033* 0.048***
) (0.020) (0.018)
80 80
66 −31.780 −29.953
0.105 0.156
ered at the group level are in parentheses. ***, **, * and # indicate significance at the 0.01,
nds to situations inwhich participants vote just after experiencing the sanction institution.
eriencing the reward institution.
models (2) and (5) confirm that police subjects exhibit a higher prefer-
ence for sanctions. Police subjects with a longer experience in the police
are much more likely than the other subjects to vote in favor of the
sanction institution before experimenting the institutions in the game
(model (5)). A possible interpretation is that being exposed to deviant
behavior and norm enforcement either during the game or in real life
(as it is the case for police officers) reinforces confidence in sanctions.
Interestingly, a comparison of estimates (1) and (5) suggests that real
experience and experience in the lab are substitutes. Finally, people
who free ride at the very beginning of this experiment are no less likely
than others to vote for the sanction institution, and amore conservative
political opinion increases the probability of voting for sanctions when
one has not yet experienced this institution (model (5)). This leads to
our final result:
Result 3. a) More experience with the social dilemma game and norm
enforcement increases the preference for sanctions. b) Police subjects are
more likely to vote for the sanction institution compared to other subjects.5. Discussion
Our study examined norm enforcement by carrots or sticks in two
distinct frames of a social dilemma. A field-experiment element was
the use of both French police commissioners and standard student
subjects. We have three main sets of findings.
First, a negatively-framed “destructive” context (TakingGame) leads
to a lower level of cooperation and to the assignment of more sanctions
and rewards when subjects decide to use these institutions. One inter-
pretation stems from the fact that negative (positive) norm violation
in the Taking Game could generate more negative (positive) emotions,
which naturally resonates with the use of sanctions (rewards).
Second, we examined subject-pool effects and showed that individ-
uals in a mission-oriented occupation responsible for norm enforce-
ment, like our new police commissioners, tend to be both more
cooperative in social dilemmas and willing to bear more of the costs
of the norm enforcement. This is especially true when the enforcement
institution uses sanctions. This translates into higher earnings not for
police subjects themselves but for groups populated with more police
subjects.
Third, regarding the implementation of norm enforcement institu-
tions, we show that a large majority of individuals generally prefer
rewards over sanctions. This result extends that of Sutter et al. (2010)
to a wider set of conditions. This preferencemay be due to awillingness
to avoid the loss of efficiency associated with sanctions and/or the
perspective of mutual benefits through positive reciprocity within
groups. Interestingly, police subjects are more likely to enforce norms
with either institution when implemented by majority vote. This effect
suggests that police subjects are particularly sensitive to the democratic
implementation of the enforcement institution. Finally, we find that
an endogenous sanction institution leads to higher contributions than
an exogenously imposed equivalent institution. We also observe that
police subjects prefer sanctions relatively more than non-police, and a
longer exposure to free riding in the experimental game leads subjects
to favor sanctions over rewards for norm enforcement. Our finding
that both types of experience (experimental or in real life through expo-
sure to crime in police work) lead to a stronger preference for sanctions
is important because it lends some support to the external validity of
evidence generated by laboratory games.
We acknowledge, however, a number of limitations to our study. It
would be desirable to recruit more experienced police commissioners.
Indeed, this would allow us to better identify whether the police-
subject effect is due to intrinsic motivation and self-selection or to the
role of experience in law enforcement. It would also allow us to under-
stand whether the higher preference of more experienced police
subjects for the sanction institution is due to more direct exposure tocrime in the field or to immersion in police culture. Moreover, the low
number of periods in our experiment penalizes sanction efficiency
because the benefits of sanctions take time to develop (see Gächter
et al., 2008), while the benefits of rewards are more immediate. Finally,
it would be also interesting to test how our findings would be affected if
groupswere rematched after each interaction.Despite these limitations,
we believe that it is important to expose norm enforcement mecha-
nisms to a large variety of environmental and institutional conditions
so as to evaluate their robustness and derive policy implications on
institutional design.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.012.References
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